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The Geneva Convention is Woefully
Outdated
John Dwight Ingram*
I.

Introduction

The subject for this article was suggested to me by a former student,
Nadia Nagib Wallace, who was in an honors course in Constitutional
Law for seniors, which I taught for many years at North Shore Country
Day School.1 As I thought about her thesis I realized that the
requirements of the Geneva Convention have never really made sense in
my lifetime and they probably had not for a long time before, not since
perhaps the days of knights and chivalry. In "modem" war, the widely
accepted purpose is to kill and destroy the enemy and its property. In
essence, the only logical "rules" must be "no holds barred."
To put my views in proper historical context, I should state briefly
that I grew up as the son of a pragmatic idealist who truly believed that it
was important to "keep the world safe for democracy." Immediately2
after college graduation in 1916, he went to India and Mesopotamia
with the YMCA in support of the British Army. As soon as the United
States entered the war in 1917, he returned home and enlisted in the Tank
Corps, serving in France and then in the Army of Occupation in
Germany in 1919.
I grew up in the 1930s, conscious at a very young age of
Mussolini's aggression in Ethiopia, and the lack of will in the League of
Nations to come to the aid of Haile Selassie. Subsequent attempts to
slow Hitler's conquests were equally ineffectual, and so we came to
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World War II, with slave labor and genocide by the Germans. Other
atrocities included the Japanese "death march" on Bataan, the war in
Vietnam, and other regional conflicts involving many violations of the
"rules of war," especially highlighting the problem of who is a civilian
and who is a combatant.
II.

"Rules of War" and the "Geneva Convention"

Over the centuries, international laws or rules have emerged to
regulate wartime conduct. These rules are designed to protect prisoners
of war, civilians, non-military targets, and other humanitarian concerns,
and also to control the means and methods of warfare. Warring parties
are expected to attack only military targets, not civilian, and to limit the
damage inflicted to only that needed to achieve an appropriate military
gain. Of course, it should be recognized that, even without these "rules,"
there have always been pragmatic restraints on warfare. For a variety of
reasons-"military, political, and economic"-combatants have strong
incentives to use no more force or destruction than is required to achieve
their goals.3 Going beyond that is likely to "waste... resources,
provoke.., retaliation, invite.., moral condemnation, and impede...
post-war relations with the enemy nation."4 Despite these inherent and
long-standing restraints, for many centuries there have
been attempts to
5
promulgate, and gain acceptance for, "rules of war.",
A.

Early History

The concept of "rules of war" goes far back into ancient history.
The law of Manu in India prohibited "the killing of the unarmed,
sleeping or wounded enemy and the use of poisoned weapons or barbed
arrows." 6 Going further, in 550 B.C. a Persian king ordered his army
doctors to care for wounded enemies.7 On the other hand, the guiding
principle in Roman law held that "anything goes" in warfare-family,
property and lives of enemies could be freely taken, and slavery and
confiscation were common.8
In the Middle Ages wars were often fought between Christian

3. Chris Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical
Historyof the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INTL. L.J. 49, 53 (1994).
4. Id. at 53-54.
5. Id. at 54.
6. Bernhardt, Rudolf, 2 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 532 (Geneva Red
Cross Conventions and Protocols) (1992) (Copy of source is on file with author)
[hereinafter Geneva Red Cross Convention].
7. Id.
8. Id.
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nations, or between Christians and infidels. 9 Of course, it was a basic
tenet of Christianity to "love thy enemy."' 0 A first step in response to
this commandment was the right to2 asylum," and the exclusion of
fighting during certain sacred periods.1
Many of the practices of chivalry in these early times were actually
the product of a desire of the Church "to protect its patron class, wealthy
knights and nobles."' 13 Thus, in 1139, the Church "denounc[ed] the
crossbow as deadly and 'odious to God' because it was used by peasants
to cut down knights and nobles at long range."' 4 The result of such
chivalric rules was to preserve the lives of knights and nobles so that
they could continue to "plunder and kill peasant soldiers, non-Christian
enemies, and civilians of all religions and ethnicities."' 5
After the Middle Ages, knighthood declined and wars were16
increasingly fought by armies composed largely of mercenaries.
Brutality in warfare became common, perhaps reaching its worst point in
the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). 1 Between 1648 and 1792 most
warfare involved small professional armies, but that changed with the
"people's armies of the French Revolution," whose patriotism and lust
8
for conquest largely negated any thought of humanitarian concerns.1
With the advent of large conscript armies in the following years, casualty
rates rose enormously for both the military and non-combatants.' 9 For
example, about sixty percent of the wounded died in the Crimean War
(1853-56).2 0
B.

Geneva Convention and 1977 Protocols

In 1859 a Swiss citizen, Henry Dunant, observed the scene of
thousands of wounded soldiers lying helpless and abandoned without
care after the Battle of Solferino. 2 1 This prompted him to propose the
creation of voluntary relief agencies that could provide care for the

9. Id. E.g., the Crusades.
10. Id.
11. Id. Proclaimed at the Council of Orleans in 511 A.D.
12. Id. Instituted by the Council of Elne in 1027 A.D., the periods were Holy Week,
Lent, Easter, Advent and Christmas.
13. Id. at 532.
14. Jochnick & Normand, supra note 4, at 61.
15. Id.
16. Geneva Red Cross Convention, supra note 7 at 532.
17. Id.
18.

Jochnick & Normand, supra note 4, at 63 n. 52.

19. Id.
20. Geneva Red Cross Convention, supra note 7, at 533.
21.

Id.
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wounded in wartime.22 This led to the Red Cross movement and the first
Geneva Convention in 1864, which proposed an agreement to protect
wounded soldiers and those caring for them in times of war.23 Twelve
nations signed on initially, and others followed in later years. 24 There
were subsequent Geneva Conventions in 1907, 1929, and 1949-the
product of 1949 and its modifications in 1977 is what is referred to today
as "The Geneva Convention., 25 Its provisions have been accepted by
virtually all of the nations of the world.2 6
The Geneva Convention was aimed primarily at protecting and
aiding the "victims of armed conflict," especially the wounded, civilians,
and prisoners of war.27 During that same time period, rules governing
"the employment of force in armed conflict" were developed in the
In sum, the result of these international
Hague Conventions.28
agreements was the wide acceptance of "rules of war."
Among the major provisions of these "rules of war" are the
following:

29

Wounded enemy soldiers should be cared for adequately.
Medical equipment and personnel should not be attacked or damaged.
Prisoners of war should be treated humanely.
Civilians should be protected and treated humanely.
Murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, and biological experiments are
prohibited.
Use of methods and weapons of warfare which will cause unnecessary
injury or suffering, or which are intended or expected to "cause
widespread,30 long-term and severe damage to the natural environment," is
prohibited.

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See The Red Cross & Red Crescent Movement and the Geneva
Conventions, available at http://www.redcross.org.au/ihl/articles/movement and-the_
genevasconventi.htm (last visited November 23, 2002).
25. Geneva Red Cross Convention, supra note 7, 531-34.
26. Id.
27. Richard John Erickson, ProtocolI: A Merging of the Hague and Geneva Law of
Armed Conflict, 19 VA. J. INTL. L. 557, 557 (1979).
28. Id.
29. See Society of Professional Journalists, Reference Guide to the Geneva
Conventions, available at http://www.genevaconventions.org/ (last visited June 21,
2004).
30. Erickson, supra note 28, at 560.
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31
Bombardment of undefended or "open" towns or cities is prohibited.

III.

Violation of the Rules of War

Until fairly recently civilians were largely spared from the ravages
of war because the belligerents did not have the technical ability to
involve them. Bombardment could be done only at close range, and
when troops got that close it was only sensible to simply to move in and
occupy undefended areas rather than destroy them. 32 But, with the
development of airplanes and long-range artillery on both land and sea,
the industry and civilian population of an enemy became desirable
targets.3 3 War was now "total," involving all persons and the entire
economic structure of each warring nation. In addition to the direct
military benefit from destruction of an enemy's productive capacity,
some saw an additional benefit in the effect such attacks might have on
enemy morale-the "will" to fight or support of the nation's war effort.34
Other examples of violations of the rules of war within my lifetime
come readily to mind:
the Nazis systematic imprisonment and
annihilation of millions of Jews and others; their use of humans for
medical experiments; the deportation of people in conquered countries to
work as slave laborers; and the destruction of whole towns and their
inhabitants.35 On the other side of the world, there was the Bataan Death
March in 1942 during which most of the American prisoners of the
Japanese died.36
Lethal and damaging gas was used in World War I, and more
recently by the United States in Vietnam.37 After the recent invasion of
Afghanistan by the United States, our government announced that it
would not abide by the Geneva Convention as to the treatment of those
taken prisoner in Afghanistan and Pakistan.3 8 Those prisoners arrived in
31. Jochnick & Normand, supra note 4, at 67.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 78.
34. Id. Of course, the devastation of civilians and their property is hardly a new
"war practice." One is reminded of Union General William Sherman's March from
Atlanta to the Sea toward the end of the Civil War. As he so succinctly stated, "War is
hell." Lt. Cmdr. Kenneth B. Brown, Counter-GuerrillaOperations: Does the Law of
War ProscribeSuccess?, 44 NAVAL L. REV. 123, 123 (1997).
35. Steven Fogelson, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled Promise, 63 S. CAL. L.
REv. 833, 834-35 (1990).
36. The Supply Sgt. of my army unit in 1952 was a survivor of that horrible
experience.
37. Erickson, supra note 28, at 562. Herbicide orange "allegedly caused long-term
genetic damage and long-term devastation of land."
38. See The Emergency Campaign to Defend Dissent and Advance Civil Rights,
United States Refuses to Abide by Geneva Convention, available at
http://www.iacenter.org/genevausrefuse.htm (last visited June 21, 2004).
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Cuba after being hooded, shackled, and blindfolded during a twentyseven hour flight. 39 They were then housed in "outdoor six by eight foot
open-air chain link cages ....

40 Also, it seems to be widely known that

Israel routinely violates the rules of war "by using Palestinians as human
shields.. . or bulldozing the houses of innocent civilians... or torturing
suspects.... ,,41
IV. Winning Is the Only Goal
There is a widely accepted guideline in big-time college and
professional sports that "winning is the only thing. 4 2 Coaches and
others talk constantly about good sportsmanship, following the rules and
"moral victories," but their actions often belie their words. Coaches and
players lose their jobs and grants-in-aid 43 if they do not win. The
pervasive inroads of this "must-win" philosophy have reached through
all levels of sports, reaching all the way down to Little League and
especially affecting coaches, parents, and other fans. At all levels, many
of those involved are quite willing to bend or break the rules of the game,
eligibility, or anything else. "Anything goes" as long as you do not get
caught. 44
The same attitude can be found as to obedience of the "rules of
war." Nations and their leaders have almost universally accepted the
Geneva Convention and other rules of war, and frequently make public
pronouncements as to their commitment to those humane guidelines.
Yet, when the chips are on the table, every nation and its leaders will
heed the words of "German Chancellor von Bismarck: 'What leader
45
would allow his country to be destroyed because of international law?"
A review of the history of warfare makes it clear that "the right of states
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Georgie Anne Geyer, Now isn't the time for bush league moves; Is U.S.
responsiblefor IsraeliPolicies, CHI. TRIB., May 10, 2002, at § 1, 23.
42. This statement is usually attributed to Vince Lombardi, the highly successful
coach of the Green Bay Packers.
43. These are often called "scholarships," an obvious misnomer, since college
players are signed up to play their sport; their only "scholarly" requirement is to do well
enough in their studies to remain eligible to play.
44. I have sometimes wondered if there is a gender distinction on this point, at least
up until high school. When I played sports it never occurred to me to voluntarily call a
foul on myself. It was up to the officials to see it and call it. Yet when I later watched
my daughters and other girls play soccer and field hockey, the players routinely called
violations (such as illegal touching) on themselves and voluntarily yielded possession of
the ball. Perhaps this was a result of the greater emphasis for boys on playing hard and
winning, as opposed to the common attitude for girls that the important thing was to play
and have fun. As female participation in sports has grown in recent years, any such
gender distinction may well have largely disappeared.
45. Jochnick & Normand, supranote 4, at 63-64.
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to self-preservation is prior to all obligations under international law [,]
and... the practical reality [is] that military commanders will always
choose to violate the law if necessary to avoid defeat., 46 "[W]hen its
survival was at stake, a state [would consider itself] 'obliged, for the
salvation of its country, to violate the rights of another state. ' ' ,4 7 This
"must win" approach is reflected in the concept of "military necessity,"
which makes it plausible for warring parties to justify almost any
conduct they wish to pursue.48
A.

Frighten the Enemy into Submission
A war conducted with energy cannot be directed merely against the
combatant forces of the enemy State and the positions they occupy,
but it will and must in like manner seek to destroy the total
intellectual and material resources of the latter. Humanitarian claims,
such as the protection of men and their goals, can only be taken
49 into
consideration in so far as the nature and object of war permit.

Whereas in earlier years it was possible, if desired, to separate
wartime combatants
from non-combatants, the growth of
industrialization and the role of industry in producing the tools of war
removed the immunity from attack that "civilian" areas had previously
enjoyed. Every part of a warring nation's economy-factories, farms,
mineral deposits, and even schools (which were training future
contributors to the overall war effort)-could now be deemed justifiable
military targets, "an integrated part of the whole war-machine. 5 ° Since
the early weapons of long-range bombardment were not very accurate,
there was unavoidably some incursion on purely non-military and nonproductive areas by aircraft and artillery attacks. 5' This gradually led to
a new view that such attacks produced the bonus result of frightening an
enemy's civilian population. As stated by the Chief of the German
Naval Staff in regard to attacks in Antwerp and Britain, "we should leave
no means untried to crush England, and... successful air raids on
London, in view of the already existing nervousness of the people, would
prove a valuable means to [that] end. 52 That attitude was clearly present
in World War II with the German bombing 53 of London, Coventry and
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 63, n.56.
Id.
Id.at 64.
Id.
Id. at 77-78.
Id. at 81.
Id.
First by conventional aircraft and in 1944 by buzz-bombs across the English
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other civilian targets in England; the firebombing of Tokyo; and the
essentially total destruction of the city of Dresden.54 The Allies'
Combined Chiefs of Staff set a goal of "'undermining the morale of the
German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is
fatally weakened."'' 55 The use of atomic bombs in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki was justified by the belief that this would terrorize the Japanese
people and their government to such an extent that they would seek
peace and an end to the war. That seems to have worked, and probably
saved the lives of millions of Allied military personnel and Japanese
military and civilians. As a practical matter, if weakening civilian
morale was a legitimate target, any bombing could be justified. In
modem times, "'it is a whole nation which wills and makes war.... The
man in the street, the voter, not the soldier or sailor,56 is the master, the
principal, the person to be impressed and won over."
B. Scare Tactics May Boomerang
Despite some success in the weakening of enemy morale,5 7 in many
cases it has not only failed to shatter enemy morale, but may well have
stiffened the spirit of resistance and a unified determination to fight
back.5 8 This was clearly evident in the reactions of the British people to
German bombing after the fall of France in 1940, as exemplified by the
words of Winston Churchill to the effect that "we will never give up." It
is also well recognized that "German [mis-] treatment of civilians in
occupied [areas in Europe] during World War II spurred active
resistance, making these areas harder to control. 5 9 Similarly, in guerrilla
warfare, "history clearly shows that those who rely on brutality and
will likely only
indiscriminate firepower to quash a guerrilla movement
60
fuel the fire they are attempting to extinguish.,
C. Guerrilla Warfare, Civil War, Rebellion
People on the outside just have no idea of what this war is all about
or how it is fought. It is a rough and brutal war. The Viet Cong have
never heard of the Marquis of Queensbury or Geneva Conventions,

Channel.
54. Jochnick & Normand, supra note 4
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.at 88.
Id. at 78, n.132.
E.g., Japan in 1945.

Jochnick & Normand, supra note 4, at 89.
Id. at 54, n.12.
Brown, supra note 35, at 123-24.
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61
and we can not afford to lose just because we have heard of them.

Those who fight against guerrilla operations rarely resist the urge to
employ tactics and methods as brutal and "unlawful" as those of the
guerrillas. However, throughout history there is clear evidence that the
use of such tactics and methods is usually counter-productive, since the
usual effect is to stiffen resistance and strengthen the support of the
guerrillas by the civilian population.6 2
Guerrilla warfare has been a part of life for many centuries,63 and is,
today, the most common form of warfare. 64 Possession of atomic
weapons by a number of nations has made full-scale all-out warfare like
that in World War II unlikely to occur. In the past fifty years virtually all
warfare has been relatively local and limited, with at least one side and
usually both feeling little if any restraint attributable to any "rules of
war."
Forces opposing guerrilla fighters find it virtually impossible to
determine who is and who is not an enemy. Guerrilla fighters have the
great advantage of being able to disappear or blend into the civilian
population. Thus, the opposing forces have a strong incentive to destroy
everything that may be useful to the guerrilla fighters: crops, livestock,
houses, etc. Also, massive destruction in an area will encourage people
to move away, thus removing a major source of support for the
guerrillas. In addition to such "voluntary" evacuations, there is a strong
incentive to actively remove civilians from the area of conflict.65
V.

Conclusion

Although it is highly questionable, perhaps it made sense in the days
of knights and chivalry to have "rules of war." More recent attempts to
codify and enforce such rules have had little real effect on the conduct of
warfare. The impracticality of the Geneva Convention and the later
Protocols can be readily seen in some rather silly distinctions that the
"rules" attempt to make. For example, one should not "kill, injure or
capture an adversary by resort to perfidy., 66 The definition of "perfidy"
includes "feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce ...[or]
,6 Yet "ruses of war"
feigning ... civilian, non-combatant status. . ...

were permitted, that is, "acts ...intended to mislead an adversary...
61.
62.

Id. at 123 (quoting an American official in Saigon during the Vietnam War).
Id. at 123-24.

63. Brown, supra note 35, at 124. E.g., Alexander the Great was met with
opposition by guerrillas around 329 B.C.
64. Two recent examples are Somalia and Afghanistan.
65. Brown, supra note 35, at 139-41.
66. Erickson, supra note 28, at 564.
67. Id.
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[such as] the use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations and
misinformation. 6 s
Another example can be found in the "rules" regarding occupants of
aircraft. The "rules" prohibited attacking a "person parachuting from an
aircraft in distress ... during his descent," but the rule did not apply to
airborne troops.69 Yet both aircraft pilots and airborne paratroops are
valuable assets of a warring nation, and the destruction of either seems
fully justified.
Many of my friends were in combat areas during World War II and
the Korean War. Others were in supposedly non-combat areas in Britain,
France and Germany during World War II. Almost without exception
they accept the fact that if a war must be engaged in, it must be fought to
win. It may seem nice to talk about humanitarian "rules of war," but no
nation and its people will allow such rules to impede or endanger its
ability to win. We should be realistic and accept the fact that "rules of
warfare" are at the very least outdated, and probably never did make
much sense. Perhaps if people, and especially their leaders, fully
recognized that warfare, even when relatively localized, will surely
involve massive destruction of property and people, both military and
civilians, there will finally be a compelling motivation to employ other
methods to resolve disputes. While we still fear the possibility of nuclear
warfare, its potential horror may well be sufficient to prevent it from
happening. For those involved in smaller wars, the consequences can be
just as devastating, because any war will be fought to win at any cost. I
still believe that the nations and people of the world can live in peace,
and can find peaceful and effective ways to resolve their disputes.
Perhaps I am an unrealistic dreamer, but I hope not.

68.
69.

Id. at 564-65.
Id. at 574.

